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Is There a Stare Decisis Doctrine in 
the Court of Arbitration for Sport? 
An Analysis of Published Awards for 
Anti-Doping Disputes in  




The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) provides a unique example of 
a private international legal regime that has almost entirely displaced 
domestic adjudication of certain types of disputes.1  Based in Lausanne, 
Switzerland, the CAS exercises jurisdiction over commercial and 
disciplinary disputes in connection with the Olympic Games, as well as 
disputes involving international sporting federations that have consented to 
CAS jurisdiction.2  In contrast to the practice in the overwhelming majority 
of arbitral tribunals, CAS panels rely heavily on previous arbitral awards in 
reaching their decisions.3  CAS panels’ liberal use of citations to previous 
CAS awards has led legal scholars to recognize the practice as evidence of 
 
 *  Annie Bersagel J.D. (2012) candidate at Stanford Law School and a former All-American in track 
and field and cross country for Wake Forest University.  She represented the United States in the 
10,000m at the 2011 Pan American Games in Guadalajara, Mexico, the 2006 World Road Running 
Championships in Debrecen, Hungary, and the 2006 Yokohama International Women’s Ekiden 
Relay in Yokohama, Japan. 
   1. Ken Foster, Is There a Global Sports Law?, 2 ENT. & SPORTS L.J., no. 1, 2003 at 15 
[hereinafter Foster, Is There a Global Sports Law?], available at 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/eslj/issues/volume2/number1/foster.pdf (discussing the 
means by which international sports federations grant the CAS exclusive jurisdiction, thereby 
restricting their members from adjudicating disputes in national courts). 
 2. History of the CAS: Origins, CT. ARB. FOR SPORT, http://www.tas-cas.org/history (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2012). 
 3. See infra notes 35-46 and accompanying text (discussing the CAS’s unique reliance on 
precedent, as compared to most arbitral tribunals). 
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an emerging lex sportiva,4 defined by CAS interpretations of a growing body 
of international sporting codes and regulations. 
While the importance of precedent in CAS awards is by now a matter 
beyond dispute,5 a more controversial claim concerns whether the CAS 
applies a de facto principle of stare decisis—a hallmark of the common law 
system—in its jurisprudence.6  In practice, application of stare decisis may 
be difficult to distinguish from that of jurisprudence constante, the civil law 
doctrine that courts should not depart from a line of past decisions “unless 
clear error is shown and injustice will arise from continuation of a particular 
rule of law.”7  Thus, in contrast to the doctrine of stare decisis, there is no 
strict requirement to follow past precedent under jurisprudence constante. 
This article adopts an empirical approach to the debate over the use of 
precedent in the CAS by analyzing a sample of CAS awards issued between 
2000 and 2010—namely, all published awards involving disciplinary 
violations related to anti-doping for the sport of track and field.  The results 
of this analysis are consistent with previous scholarship noting the CAS’s 
tendency to follow past precedent.8  Nevertheless, CAS panels’ explicit 
rejection of a doctrine of stare decisis suggests the practice is better 
characterized as a doctrine of jurisprudence constante.9  This study supports 
 
 4. See, e.g., FRANCK LATTY, LA LEX SPORTIVA: RECHERCHE SUR LE DROIT TRANSNATIONAL 
(2007); Ken Foster, Lex Sportiva and Lex Ludica: The Court of Arbitration for Sport’s 
Jurisprudence, 3 ENT. & SPORTS L.J., no. 2, 2005 [hereinafter Foster, Lex Sportiva and Lex Ludica], 
available at 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/eslj/issues/volume3/number2/foster/foster.pdf. 
 5. See, e.g., Canadian Olympic Comm. (COC) v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 
2002/O/373, ¶ 14 (Dec. 18, 2003) (“CAS jurisprudence has notably refined and developed a number 
of principles of sports law . . . which might be deemed part of an emerging ‘lex sportiva.’”). 
 6. Compare Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse? 
23 ARB. INT’L 357, 366 (2007) [hereinafter Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent] (arguing that 
CAS awards “demonstrate the existence of a true stare decisis doctrine within the field of sports 
arbitration”), with IAN S. BLACKSHAW, SPORT, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION 155 (2009) 
(observing that “CAS arbitrators . . . are not generally obliged to follow earlier decisions (stare 
decisis), but they usually do so in the interests of legal certainty”).  See also Matthew J. Mitten & 
Hayden Opie, “Sports Law”: Implications for the Development of International, Comparative, and 
National Law and Global Dispute Resolution, 85 TUL. L. REV. 269, 291 (2010) (questioning whether 
“CAS jurisprudence [is] functioning as a de facto body of common law legal precedent”).  
 7. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 933 (9th ed. 2009).  See Andrè Tunc, Methodology of the Civil 
Law in France, in CIVIL LAW 327, 332-33 (Ralf Rogowski ed., 1996) (describing French courts’ 
reliance on the decisions of the Court of Cassation). 
 8. See, e.g., BLACKSHAW, supra note 6; Foster, Lex Sportiva and Lex Ludica, supra note 4, at 
12; Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent, supra note 6. 
 9. See, e.g., Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. U.S.A. Track & Field (USATF), CAS 
2004/A/628 (June 28, 2004); Anderson v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2008/A/1545, ¶ 3 (July 
16, 2010) (“In CAS jurisprudence there is no principle of binding precedent (‘stare decisis’ or 
‘collateral estoppel’).”). 
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the hypothesis that the use of precedent depends on panel composition.  
Most panels in this study consisted of both common law and civil law 
arbitrators, and those comprised of solely civil law jurists were just as likely 
to cite precedent as common law panels.10  Further research is needed to 
clarify how the use of precedent in the CAS interacts with the institution’s 
default rules for choice of law. 
Part I of this article outlines a brief history of the CAS and its 
procedural rules.  Part II describes the debate over whether the CAS follows 
a doctrine of stare decisis.  Part III sets out the methodology used.  Part IV 
describes the results of the analysis, including an in-depth look at two 
awards that touch directly on the relevance of past arbitral awards.  Part V 
concludes by discussing the implications of the results of this study and 
suggesting avenues for future research. 
II. OVERVIEW OF CAS HISTORY AND PROCEDURE 
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) established the CAS in 
198411 to create a uniform body of rules for international sports disputes, and 
to avoid the problem of athletes pursuing complex and costly litigation in 
national courts.12  Two different arbitration divisions comprise the CAS: 
Ordinary and Appellate.13  The CAS has also established ad hoc tribunals for 
the Olympic Games14 and other major international sports competitions, 
such as the Fèdèration Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World 
Cup soccer tournament.15  The CAS Ad Hoc Division hears disputes on-site 
and render decisions within twenty-four hours.16  The Ordinary Arbitration 
 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. BLACKSHAW, supra note 6, at 151-52. 
 12. Since 1994, the CAS has been organized under the International Council of Arbitration for 
Sport, rather than the IOC, but the IOC still funds a major portion of the CAS budget.  Id. at 152. 
 13. Id. at 152. 
 14. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., OLYMPIC CHARTER 103 (2011), available at 
www.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf (“Any dispute rising on the occasion of, or in 
connection with, the Olympic Games shall be submitted exclusively to the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport (CAS), in accordance with the Code of Sports-Related Arbitration.”). 
 15. FÈDÈRATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASS’N, FIFA STATUTES: REGULATIONS 
GOVERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTES STANDING ORDERS OF THE CONGRESS 44 (2011), 
available at 
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/01/48/60/05/fifastatuten2011%5fe.pdf 
(Article 62 states that “the CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration shall apply to the proceedings”). 
 16. The first CAS Ad Hoc Tribunal was established for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in 
Atlanta, Georgia.  See generally GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER, ARBITRATION AT THE OLYMPICS: 
3
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Division handles disputes referred by the parties directly to the CAS; most 
often, commercial cases or disputes between sports federations.17  The 
Appeals Arbitration Division hears appeals from decisions of international 
and national federations, usually involving disciplinary cases.18  Both 
divisions review questions of law and fact de novo,19 and CAS awards are 
final and binding.20 
The Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, the CAS’s governing statute, 
designates Lausanne, Switzerland as the arbitral seat for any CAS arbitration 
proceeding,21 regardless of whether the actual hearing takes place in 
Switzerland.22  As a result, domestic courts recognize CAS awards as 
foreign arbitral awards for purposes of the New York Convention.23  Thus, 
parties may only petition to set aside a CAS award through the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal (Supreme Court).24  For courts outside of Switzerland, the 
 
ISSUES OF FAST-TRACK DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND SPORTS LAW 1 (2001) [hereinafter KAUFMANN-
KOHLER, ARBITRATION AT THE OLYMPICS]. 
 17. History of the CAS: Types of Disputes Submitted to the CAS, CT. ARB. FOR SPORT, 
http://www.tas-cas.org/en/infogenerales.asp/4-3-239-1011-4-1-1/5-0-1011-3-0-0/ (last visited Mar. 
31, 2012). 
 18. Id. 
 19. “The Panel shall have full power to review the facts and the law.”  INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., 
STATUTES OF THE BODIES WORKING FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF SPORTS-RELATED DISPUTES R57 
(2010) [hereinafter CAS CODE], available at 
http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/3923/5048/0/Code%202010%20(en).pdf.  The CAS Code 
is also known as the Code of Sports-Related Arbitration.  For a critique of the CAS Appellate 
Division’s de novo standard of arbitral review, see Maureen A. Weston, Simply a Dress Rehearsal? 
U.S. Olympic Sports Arbitration and De Novo Review at the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 38 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 97, 103-04 (2009) (arguing that by granting the CAS the power to hear cases de 
novo, “the United States has implicitly assigned the protection of the rights of its citizens to a private 
international tribunal seated in a foreign nation”). 
 20. Although the name suggests otherwise, awards rendered by the Ordinary Arbitration 
Division may not be appealed to the Appeals Arbitration Division unless “such appeal has been 
expressly provided by the rules applicable to the procedure of first instance.”  CAS CODE, supra note 
19, at R47. 
 21. Id. at R28. 
 22. In the case of Raguz v Sullivan, an Australian athlete challenged a CAS award made in 
Sydney, Australia in connection with the 2000 Summer Olympic Games on the grounds that the 
New York Convention did not apply to an arbitral proceeding held in Australia involving Australian 
parties.  Raguz v Sullivan [2000] NSWCA 240 (Austl.).  The Court of New South Wales upheld the 
award, holding that designation of Switzerland as the arbitral seat rendered the award “non-
domestic” for purposes of the New York Convention.  Id. 
 23. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 
1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
 24. 20 Questions About the CAS: Is it Possible to Appeal Against a CAS Award?, CT. ARB. 
FOR SPORT, http://www.tas-cas.org/en/20questions.asp/4-3-231-1010-4-1-1/5-0-1010-13-0-0/ (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2012). 
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grounds for resisting enforcement in domestic courts are limited to those 
found in the New York Convention.25 
Each of the two main CAS divisions has its own set of default rules for 
the applicable substantive law.26  Both rely primarily on international 
sporting codes and the Olympic Charter, but the choice of subsidiary law 
varies by division.27  For the Ordinary Arbitration Division, the CAS Code 
provides that: “The Panel shall decide the dispute according to the rules of 
law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of such a choice, according to 
Swiss law.”28  In contrast, the default rule for subsidiary law in the Appeals 
Arbitration Division is: “[T]he law of the country in which the federation, 
association or sports-related body which has issued the challenged decision 
is domiciled or according to the rules of law, the application of which the 
Panel deems appropriate.”29  Since most international sports federations are 
located in Switzerland, both divisions usually apply the same law.30  For 
track and field, however, since the International Association of Athletics 
Federations (IAAF) headquarters are in Monaco,31 the subsidiary law 
applicable to disputes is either Swiss or Monegasque law, depending on 
whether the Ordinary or Appeals Arbitration Division hears the dispute.32 
An athlete becomes a party to an agreement to arbitrate disputes at the 
CAS through two possible avenues: (1) through the bylaws of national 
sporting federations, of which athletes are members,33 and (2) through 
signing the entry form required for participation in the Olympic games, 
 
 25. New York Convention, supra note 23, art. 5. 
 26. CAS CODE, supra note 19, at S3. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at R45. 
 29. Id. at R58. 
 30. Forty-seven international sports federations are based in Switzerland, compared to five in 
Monaco, the next most popular federation host country.  Samuel Jaberg, How Switzerland 
Champions Champions, SWISSINFO.CH (Julia Slater trans., Jan. 25, 2010, 1:17 PM), 
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/specials/switzerland_for_the_record/world_records/How_Switzerland_
champions_champions.html?cid=8149794. 
 31. INT’L ASS’N OF ATHLETICS FED’NS, CONSTITUTION 7 (2011), available at 
 http://www.iaaf.org/mm/Document/06/28/25/ded17e35-fb04-4a83-801f-
a3dcf4ec5f38_PDF_English.pdf (Article 1 states that “[t]he IAAF is established for an indefinite 
period with legal status as an association under the laws of Monaco (Act No. 1072 of 27 June 
1984)”). 
 32. CAS CODE, supra note 19, at R45, R58. 
 33. KAUFMANN-KOHLER, ARBITRATION AT THE OLYMPICS, supra note 16, at 106-07. 
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which contains an agreement to arbitrate disputes according to the Olympic 
Charter and Swiss law.34 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Precedent in Arbitration 
In general, arbitral awards do not have precedential value.35  This 
follows from the practice of keeping international arbitral awards 
confidential.36  It would be unfair and impractical to require parties to rely 
on secret precedents.37  Nevertheless, certain arbitral tribunals do ascribe 
precedential value to past arbitral awards—for example, in international 
maritime and construction arbitration.38  Proponents of using arbitral 
precedent justify the practice as a means for the parties to reap the benefits 
of the arbitrators’ industry-specific knowledge and expertise.39  Reliance on 
precedent also promotes legal uniformity and consistency.40 
Both of these arguments apply to the use of arbitral precedent in the 
international sports context.  In establishing the CAS, the IOC aimed to 
provide a “level playing field” for competitors from different countries and 
to create a uniquely specialized sports dispute resolution forum.41  There are 
also practical reasons that may explain the CAS’s reliance on previous 
arbitral awards.  Since the CAS exercises near exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction over disputes in Olympic sports,42 national courts no longer have 
occasion to interpret international sports charters or codes.  This lack of 
judicial precedent grows even more pronounced as these charters and codes 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION § 1.113 (student version, 5th ed., 2009) (“There is no system of binding precedents in 
international arbitration . . . .”). 
 36. GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1059 (2010). 
 37. BLACKSHAW, supra note 6, at 159 (stating that “the CAS is able to grant parties in dispute 
very valuable, relevant and generally effective kinds of interim protection and relief at an early stage 
in the proceedings; and these measures deserve to be better known and more widely used”). 
 38. BORN, supra note 36, at 1059. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See BLACKSHAW, supra note 6, at 155. 
 41. See id. (one-fifth of the arbitrators are chosen with a view to safeguarding the interests of 
the athletes). 
 42. See id. at 154.  Submission forms required for athletes to participate in the Olympic Games 
include a standard arbitration clause which states: “I agree that any dispute . . . shall be submitted 
exclusively to the Court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS).”  Id. 
6
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are amended or replaced.  As a result, domestic judicial interpretations of 
international sports regulations may be practically unavailable. 
Other scholars have identified more cynical motives for the emergence 
of a lex sportiva—namely, as “a cloak for continued self-regulation by 
international sports federations.”43  Under this interpretation, the use of 
arbitral precedent arises as a means of avoiding national legislation 
altogether.  Indeed, CAS decisions are generally self-enforcing within 
international sports bodies.44  For disciplinary violations, the sanctions often 
include disqualification or ineligibility for participation in international 
sports.45  Thus, even if a national sports federation wished to evade 
enforcement of a CAS award, the athlete involved would still remain 
ineligible for international competition.  As a result, the CAS rarely requires 
the assistance of national authorities for enforcement of its awards.46 
B. Stare Decisis or Jurisprudence Constante? 
Regardless of the reasons for the CAS’s reliance on precedent, there is 
little doubt that the practice occurs.47  The question remains, however, 
whether CAS case law constitutes binding or persuasive authority.  No CAS 
panel has gone so far as to explicitly recognize a principle of stare decisis, 
but panels’ frequent citations to previous CAS awards suggests a de facto 
doctrine of stare decisis may already be in operation.48  More precisely, the 
question is whether the CAS applies a doctrine of horizontal stare decisis, 
“the doctrine that a court . . . must adhere to its own prior decisions, unless it 
finds compelling reasons to overrule itself.”49  Alternatively, what appears to 
be a doctrine of stare decisis from the perspective of a common law scholar 
may be more accurately described as a doctrine of jurisprudence constante, 
 
 43. Foster, Is There a Global Sports Law?, supra note 1, at 2-18. 
 44. See BLACKSHAW, supra note 6, at 174 (“[T]he CAS decisions are legally effective and can 
be enforced internationally.”). 
 45. See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving challenges to 
sanctions imposed for disciplinary violations). 
 46. One possible exception in which the CAS might require the assistance of national 
authorities would be for provisional relief measures; however, this question remains a matter of 
debate.  BLACKSHAW, supra note 6, at 158-59. 
 47. See, e.g., Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent, supra note 6 (noting the CAS’s frequent 
citations to precedent). 
 48. See, e.g., Anderson v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), 2008/A/1545 (July 16, 2010) 
(containing over twenty citations to previous CAS awards). 
 49. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009). 
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in which the CAS generally follows the weight of past precedent, but 
remains free to depart from previous awards in the interests of justice.50 
C. Departures from Precedent in the CAS 
Scholars have identified at least one counterexample to the CAS trend of 
following past awards.51  A commonly cited example of lex sportiva is the 
principle of strict liability for doping cases.52  That is, the existence of a 
positive doping test is itself sufficient to establish a violation, regardless of 
the athlete’s state of mind.53  Nevertheless, in both A. v. Federation 
Internationale de Luttes Associees (FILA)54 and Q. v. Union Internationale 
de Tir (UIT),55 CAS panels declined to recognize a general principle of strict 
liability.  In the Q. case, decided in 1995, the panel concluded that the 
international shooting federation’s (UIT)56 doping regulations did not create 
a rule of strict liability.57  Thus, subsequent cases recognizing a general 
principle of strict liability for all sports conflict with the panel’s decision in 
Q., which held instead that the relevant sporting code must clearly establish 
a standard of strict liability.58 
In the Fritz Aanes case, the panel acknowledged that previous CAS 
awards recognized a general principle of strict liability, but decided instead 
to treat a positive doping test as presumptive evidence of guilt and allow the 
athlete to rebut the presumption.59  Janwillem Soek observes that the panel 
in the Fritz Aanes case was comprised of lawyers from the civil law 
tradition, whereas panels comprised of common law jurists issued previous 
 
 50. Id. at 933 (defining jurisprudence constante as the “doctrine that a court should give great 
weight to a rule of law that is accepted and applied in a long line of cases . . . unless clear error is 
shown and injustice will arise from continuation of a particular rule of law.”). 
 51. JANWILLEM SOEK, THE STRICT LIABILITY PRINCIPLE AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF 
ATHLETES IN DOPING CASES 164-67 (2006) (citing A. v. Fed’n Internationale de Luttes Associees 
(FILA), CAS 2000/A/317 (July 9, 2001) as a counterexample to the principle of strict liability).  
 52. Canadian Olympic Comm. (COC) v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2002/O/373, ¶ 14 
(Dec. 18, 2003). 
 53. Id. 
 54. A., CAS 2000/A/317, at ¶ 39. 
 55. Q. v. Union Internationale de Tir (UIT), CAS 94/129, ¶ 21 (May 23, 1995). 
 56. In 1998, the Union Internationale de Tir (UIT) was renamed the “International Shooting 
Sport Federation.”  The ISSF History, INT’L SHOOTING SPORT FED’N, http://www.issf-
sports.org/theissf/history.ashx (last visited Mar. 31, 2012). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. ¶ 34-35. 
 59. A., CAS 2000/A/317, at ¶ 39 (“[T]he Panel is conscious of the fact that there have been 
CAS decisions where the Panel was prepared to apply a strict liability standard with respect to 
suspensions and was not willing to take into account the subjective elements of the case in 
questions.”). 
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decisions on strict liability.60  Likewise, three civil law jurists served as 
arbitrators in the Q. case.61  This suggests the use of precedent may vary 
depending on the backgrounds of the arbitrators.62 
IV. METHODS 
The sample analyzed consists of published awards for track and field 
involving doping allegations.63  These include decisions on individual 
doping violations and the consequence of doping violations for relay 
eligibility.64  Within a single sport and type of dispute there should be less 
variation in the amount of applicable precedent than would be the case if a 
greater variety of cases were examined.65  As a result, variations in the use of 
precedent in the cases sampled should be more likely to result from panel 
decision making than the lack of applicable precedent for a certain type of 
case.66 
There are two main sources of published awards: the three-volume print 
Digest of CAS Awards67 and the CAS website, which includes a searchable 
database of awards.68  Neither source is comprehensive.  The editors of the 
print volumes selected cases they considered noteworthy.69  Although the 
CAS has announced its intention to publish on its website all 
 
 60. SOEK, supra note 51, at 167.  The arbitrators in the A. case were German, Norwegian, and 
Swiss.  Id. 
 61. Two of the arbitrators in the Q. case were from Switzerland and the third was from France.  
Q., CAS 94/129, at 1. 
 62. Id. 
 63.  See infra note 71. 
 64. See e.g., U.S. Olympic Comm. (USOC) v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2004/A/725 
(July 20, 2005). 
 65. See e.g., Canadian Olympic Comm. (COC) v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 
2002/O/373, ¶ 14 (Dec. 18, 2003). 
 66. See, e.g., Ohuruogu v. U.K. Athletics Ltd. (UKA), CAS 2006/A/1165, ¶ 17 (Apr. 3, 2007). 
 67. COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS: 1986–1998 (Matthieu 
Reeb ed., 1998) [hereinafter CAS DIGEST I]; COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, DIGEST OF CAS 
AWARDS II: 1998–2000 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 2002) [hereinafter CAS DIGEST II]; COURT OF 
ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS III: 2001–2003 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 2004) 
[hereinafter CAS DIGEST III]. 
 68. Welcome to the “Jurisprudence” Database!, CT. ARB. FOR SPORT (July 10, 2009, 11:24 
PM), http://jurisprudence.tas-cas.org/sites/caselaw/help/home.aspx. 
 69. CAS DIGEST I, supra note 47, at XXIII. 
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nonconfidential awards issued since the tribunal was first established, the 
database is still under construction.70 
A total of twenty-three awards were examined.71  These include two 
awards from ad hoc panels for the Olympic Games, three awards made in 
Ordinary Arbitration Division proceedings, and eighteen awards rendered on 
appeal from national or international federation decisions.72  The awards 
were issued between 2000 and 2010.73 
Each arbitral award was analyzed according to the following criteria: (1) 
whether it included citations to previous CAS awards; (2) whether the panel 
followed, distinguished, or rejected precedent; (3) the proposition which the 
cited award(s) stands for; and (4) whether the panel was comprised of 
common law jurists, civil law jurists, or a mix of the two.  The author 
expected that panels would cite frequently to past awards and tend to follow 
precedent, and when panels did in fact depart from precedent, they were 
more likely to be comprised of civil law jurists than jurists from common 
law backgrounds or a mix of the two. 
 
 70. “As of January 2009, the awards issued after 2003 are gradually being added to the 
database so that in the long term . . . there will be a complete coverage of the CAS awards.”  
Welcome to the Database of CAS Awards, CT. ARB. FOR SPORT, http://www.tas-
cas.org/jurisprudence-archives (last visited Mar. 26, 2012). 
 71. Anderson v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), 2008/A/1545 (July 16, 2010); Devyatovskiy v. 
Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2009/A/1752 (June 10, 2010); Anderson v. Int’l Olympic Comm. 
(IOC), 2008/A/1545 PA (Dec. 18, 2009);  Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. All Russia 
Fed’n, CAS 2008/A/1718 (Nov. 18, 2009); Kop v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF), CAS 
2008/A/1585 (Nov. 10, 2009); Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. Real Federatión Española 
de Atletismo (RFEA), CAS 2009/A/1805 (Sept. 22, 2009); Gatlin v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency 
(USADA), CAS 2008/A/1461 (June 6, 2008); Ohuruogu v. U.K. Athletics Ltd. (UKA), CAS 
2006/A/1165 (Apr. 3, 2007); U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) v. G., 2004/O/649 (Dec. 13, 
2005); U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) v. M., CAS 2004/O/645 (Dec. 13, 2005); U.S. Olympic 
Comm. (USOC) v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2004/A/725 (July 20, 2005); A. v. Int’l 
Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2004/A/718 (Mar. 31, 2005); F. v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 
2004/A/714 (Mar. 31, 2005); Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. U.S.A. Track & Field 
(USATF), CAS 2004/A/628 (June 28, 2004); Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. Fèdèration 
Royale Marocaine d’Athlètisme (MAR), CAS 2003/A/452 (Nov. 19, 2003); Int’l Ass’n of Athletics 
Fed’ns (IAAF) v. Fèdèration Camerounaise d’Athlètisme (CMR), CAS 2003/A/448 (Oct. 2, 2003); 
W. v. UK Athletics, CAS 2003/A/455 (Aug. 21, 2003); Longo v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletic Fed’ns 
(IAAF), CAS 2002/A/409 (Mar. 28, 2003); Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. U.S.A. Track 
& Field (USATF), CAS 2002/O/401 (Jan. 10, 2003); Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. CAF 
& Z., CAS 2002/A/362 (Aug. 27, 2002); F. v. Int’l Sports Org. for the Disabled (ISOD), CAS 
2001/A/328 (Aug. 3, 2001); Melinte v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n (IAAF), CAS 00/015 (Sept. 29, 
2000); Baumann v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 00/006 (Sept. 22, 2000). 
 72. See supra note 51. 
 73. See, e.g., Anderson, CAS 2008/A/1545; Baumann, CAS 00/006. 
10
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol12/iss2/1
[Vol. 12: 189, 2012]  
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
199 
There are a few main limitations to this study.  First, not all CAS 
decisions are published.74  While publication remains the default rule, parties 
may opt to keep the award confidential.75  This may lead to selection bias if 
parties prefer to avoid disclosing awards that deviate from past CAS 
jurisprudence.  Another potential source of bias is the lack of access to the 
parties’ briefs.76  In their awards, panels might refer only to previous arbitral 
awards that the panel believes were rightly decided.  Thus, panels might 
ignore contrary citations in a party’s submissions that would reveal the 
panel’s divergence from past precedent.  Lastly, this study addresses only 
disciplinary cases.  The CAS also hears commercial disputes, which most 
likely involve greater overlap with existing domestic and international 
regulation—such as European Union competition rules.77  As a result, the 
findings in this study may not apply to commercial cases. 
V. RESULTS 
A. Frequency and Use of Precedent 
Of the twenty-three awards analyzed,78 seventeen contain at least one 
citation to a previous CAS award.79  In each award that contained a citation 
to precedent, the panel either followed or distinguished80 previous CAS 
awards.  None of the awards explicitly departed from precedent.81  For 
 
 74. See Procedural Rules: A. General Provisions, CT. ARB. FOR SPORT, http://www.tas-
cas.org/rules (last visited Mar. 26, 2012) [hereinafter Procedural Rules] (explaining that arbiters 
“may decide to publish”); Are the Arbitration Proceedings Confidential?, CT. ARB. FOR SPORT, 
http://www.tas-cas.org/en/20questions.asp/4-3-229-1010-4-1-1/5-0-1010-13-0-0/ (last visited Mar. 
26, 2012) [hereinafter Proceedings Confidential]. 
 75. Proceedings Confidential, supra note 54 (“Generally speaking, unless the parties agree 
otherwise, the award may be published by the CAS.”). 
 76. Id. (“The parties, arbitrators and CAS staff are obliged not to disclose any information 
connected with the dispute.”). 
 77. See What Kinds of Dispute Can Be Submitted to the CAS?, CT. ARB. FOR SPORT, 
http://www.tas-cas.org/en/20questions.asp/4-3-217-1010-4-1-1/5-0-1010-13-0-0/ (last visited Mar. 
26, 2012) (writing that CAS accepts “disputes of a commercial nature (e.g. a sponsorship contract)”).  
 78. See infra Table 1. 
 79. See supra note 51. 
 80. See, e.g., Ohuruogu v. U.K. Athletics Ltd. (UKA), CAS 2006/A/1165, ¶ 17 (Apr. 3, 2007)  
(explicitly distinguishing a previous award). 
 81. Id. 
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awards that did not contain references to past precedent, the panel appeared 
to find the applicable sporting codes dispositive.82 
An example from two disputes with nearly identical facts illustrates the 
CAS panels’ approach to previous awards.  In United States Olympic 
Committee (USOC) v. International Olympic Committee (IOC), the panel 
was asked to determine whether the members of the United States 4x400 
meter relay team from the 2000 Summer Olympic Games in Sydney, 
Australia would be allowed to keep their gold medals following the 
revelation that one of the team members, Jerome Young, had been found 
guilty of a doping offense prior to the Olympic Games and was therefore 
ineligible to compete.83  The International Amateur Athletic Federation 
(IAAF) Rules in force in 2000 did not expressly address the consequences of 
doping offenses for relay teams, only for individual athletes.84  The IAAF 
cited to previous CAS awards from team sports to argue that a single team 
member’s ineligibility should nevertheless result in disqualification of the 
entire team.85  The panel rejected the IAAF’s argument, ruling that previous 
awards in other sports were not applicable; the plain language of the IAAF 
Rules omitted any sanctions for relay teams.86  Instead, the panel cited Q.87 
for the proposition that there is no liability unless an offense is clearly stated 
in the relevant code.88  In other words, sanctions must be predictable.  As a 
result, the panel allowed the athletes to keep their medals.89 
Four years later, a CAS panel again faced a nearly identical set of facts 
in Andrea Anderson v. International Olympic Committee (IOC).90  The 
dispute arose following United States sprinter Marion Jones’s admission that 
she had taken performance-enhancing drugs before, during, and after the 
2000 Summer Olympic Games.91  Jones had competed in two relay races in 
Sydney, Australia, winning the bronze medal in the 4x100 meter relay and 
the gold medal in the 4x400 meter relay.92  Despite the CAS ruling in the 
 
 82. See, e.g., Gatlin v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA), CAS 2008/A/1461 (June 6, 2008) 
(holding that the plain language of the IAAF rules regarding a second doping offense determined the 
length of United States sprinter Justin Gatlin’s suspension from competition). 
 83. U.S. Olympic Comm. (USOC) v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2004/A/725 (July 20, 
2005). 
 84. Id. ¶ 14. 
 85. Id. ¶ 8. 
 86. Id. ¶ 7. 
 87. Q. v. Union Internationale de Tir (UIT), CAS 94/129, ¶ 21 (May 23, 1995). 
 88. Id. ¶ 21. 
 89. U.S. Olympic Comm. (USOC) v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2004/A/725, at 11 
(July 20, 2005). 
 90. Anderson v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2008/A/1545 (July 16, 2010). 
 91. Id. at 2. 
 92. Id. at 3. 
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Jerome Young case, the IOC Disciplinary Commission demanded that 
Jones’s teammates return their medals.93  The athletes appealed to the CAS, 
arguing that the Young award was dispositive for their case.94  The panel 
agreed that the Young case was directly on point, but rejected the appellants’ 
contention that a doctrine of stare decisis must apply: “This does not 
automatically entail that the Panel is bound to decide in the same way as in 
CAS 2004/A/725 on the basis of either the ‘stare decisis’ or the ‘collateral 
estoppel’ principles, as advocated by the Appellants.”95 
While the panel ultimately followed the Young award by overturning 
the IOC Disciplinary Commission’s decision, it was careful to explain that 
the Young award constituted persuasive, rather than binding precedent: 
“[A]lthough a CAS panel in principle might end up deciding differently 
from a previous panel, it must accord to previous CAS awards a substantial 
precedential value and it is up to the party advocating a jurisprudential 
change to submit persuasive arguments and evidence to that effect.”96  Thus, 
while in practice, the CAS did not depart from precedent in this sample of 
awards, CAS panels explicitly defend their authority to do so should the 
need arise. 
B. Types of Propositions Advanced 
The type of proposition advanced fell into four general categories: (1) 
use of a particular testing method or procedure as evidence of a doping 
violation; (2) substance of parties’ right to be heard; (3) rules of evidence; 
and (4) general principles of equity. 
In the first category, awards cited to precedent to support the use of a 
specific type of technical evidence to confirm a doping violation.97  The 
athletes involved had each attempted to discredit a positive doping test on 
the grounds that the testing methods were somehow scientifically unproven 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. ¶ 50. 
 95. Id. ¶ 52. 
 96. Id. ¶ 55. 
 97. See Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’n (IAAF) v. Fèdèration Royale Marocaine d’Athlètisme 
(MAR), CAS 2003/A/452, ¶ 17 (Nov. 19, 2003); Melinte v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n (IAAF), 
CAS 00/015, ¶ 8 (Sept. 29, 2000); Baumann v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 00/006, ¶ 40 
(Sept. 22, 2000). 
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or illegitimate.98  In the three awards examined, CAS panels dismissed these 
allegations by citing to past awards that found doping violations based on 
the same testing methods.99  For example, in International Association of 
Athletics Federations (IAAF) v. Fédération Royale Marocaine d’Athlétisme 
(MAR), the Moroccan Track and Field Federation and the world record 
holder in the steeplechase, Brahmin Boulami, challenged the results of an in-
competition doping test conducted on Boulami in Zurich, Switzerland, 
which detected the presence of the blood booster erythropoietin (EPO).100  
The Moroccan Track and Field Federation argued that the testing method 
used was scientifically suspect and not “internationally recognized.”101  The 
CAS panel dismissed this claim, noting that the same testing method had 
been used in previous cases arbitrated at the CAS in connection with the 
2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City, Utah.102 
The second category of precedent involves disputes in which one of the 
parties claimed that irregularities in the initial national or international 
disciplinary hearing violated the party’s right to be heard.103  For example, in 
A. v. International Olympic Committee (IOC), Adrìan Annus, a Hungarian 
hammer thrower, challenged the IOC’s decision to strip him of his gold 
medal after Annus failed to submit to drug testing.104  Annus claimed, inter 
alia, that the IOC’s disciplinary hearing was invalid because he did not 
attend, due to poor health.105  The panel rejected Annus’s claim—as did the 
panels in the three other cases in the sample involving violations of the right 
to be heard—on the ground that the CAS’s de novo standard of review cures 
any deficiencies in the initial disciplinary proceedings.106 
An example from the third category, rules of evidence, is the rule that a 
tribunal may—but is not required to—draw adverse inferences from a 
party’s silence.  In United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) v. M., the 
panel considered how it should address United States sprinter Tim 
Montgomery’s refusal to testify in response to allegations that Montgomery 
 
 98. Baumann, CAS 00/006, ¶ 40 (a)-(c); Melinte, CAS 00/015, ¶ 8; MAR, CAS 2003/A/452, ¶ 
9. 
 99. Baumann, CAS 00/006, ¶ 40 (a)-(c); Melinte, CAS 00/015, ¶ 8; MAR, CAS 2003/A/452, ¶ 
16-59. 
 100. MAR, CAS 2003/A/452, at 1-2. 
 101. Id. ¶ 10. 
 102. Id. ¶ 17. 
 103. See A. v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), 2004/A/718, ¶ 7 (Mar. 31, 2005); F. v. Int’l 
Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2004/A/714, ¶ 11 (Mar. 31, 2005); W. v. U.K. Athletics, CAS 
2003/A/455, ¶ 12 (Aug. 21, 2003); Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’n (IAAF) v. CAF & Z., CAS 
2002/A/362, ¶ 21 (Aug. 27, 2002). 
 104. A., 2004/A/718, at 1-3. 
 105. Id. ¶ 6. 
 106. Id. ¶ 7. 
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used performance-enhancing drugs obtained through the Bay Area 
Laboratory Cooperative (BALCO).107  Although the panel noted that 
previous CAS awards permitted a panel to draw “certain adverse 
inferences”108 in this context, the panel concluded that the case against 
Montgomery was strong enough that no adverse inference was needed.109 
Lastly, CAS panels rely on previous awards to establish general 
equitable principles.  For example, in International Association of Athletics 
Federations (IAAF) v. U.S.A. Track & Field (USATF), the panel faced a 
dispute over whether USATF was required to disclose to the IAAF the 
identities of athletes who were exonerated in USATF disciplinary 
hearings.110  Over a four-year period, USATF responded to IAAF requests 
for this information by citing the USATF confidentiality policy and asking 
the IAAF to point to the specific IAAF rule that required disclosure.111  The 
IAAF did not respond to USATF’s repeated requests.112  The CAS panel 
resolved the issue by citing to previous cases for the proposition that, 
“[W]here the conduct of one party has led to legitimate expectations on the 
part of a second party, the first party is estopped from changing its course of 
action to the detriment of the second party.”113  Since the IAAF did not 
respond to USATF’s requests, and the athletes in question had received 
USATF’s contractual assurances that their identities would not be released, 
the CAS panel ruled that the IAAF was equitably estopped from requesting 
this information.114  Revealing the athletes’ identities would conflict with 
both the legitimate expectations of USATF and the athletes involved.115 
C. Panel Composition 
This study provides no support for the theory that an arbitrator’s 
background determines a panel’s approach to precedent.  Of the twenty-three 
 
 107. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) v. M., CAS 2004/O/645, ¶ 9 (Dec. 13, 2005) (error 
in original source has two ¶¶ 9-11). 
 108. Id. ¶ 11. 
 109. Id. ¶ 9. 
 110. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’n (IAAF) v. U.S.A. Track & Field (USATF), CAS 
2002/O/401 (Jan. 10, 2003). 
 111. Id. ¶ 42-52. 
 112. Id. ¶ 53. 
 113. Id. ¶ 68. 
 114. Id. ¶ 72-77. 
 115. Id. 
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total awards, five were issued by panels comprised of exclusively common 
law jurists, three by exclusively civil law jurists, and fourteen by a 
combination of the two.116  Of the five awards from common law panels, 
three included citations to precedent,117 and two of the three civil law panels 
did as well.118  Thus, the percentage of awards that cited previous arbitral 
awards was actually slightly higher for civil law panels than for common 
law panels.  For mixed panels, twelve of fourteen cited to past precedent.119 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The results of this study lend further support to the view that the CAS is 
developing its own body of private international legal precedent outside the 
purview of domestic legislation.  Although CAS panels unambiguously 
reject the notion that they apply a doctrine of stare decisis, this study 
illustrates panels’ de facto adherence to precedent.  As long as CAS panels 
continue to assert their authority to depart from past precedent, the CAS 
approach appears more akin to one of jurisprudence constante than stare 
decisis.120  For parties, the practical implication is perhaps the same under 
either doctrine—claims that run contrary to previous CAS awards are 
 
 116. F. v. Int’l Sports Org. for the Disabled (ISOD), CAS 2001/A/328 (Aug. 3, 2001) 
(arbitrators not named). 
 117. Compare U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) v. G., 2004/O/649 (Dec. 13, 2005); U.S. 
Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) v. M., CAS 2004/O/645 (Dec. 13, 2005); Baumann v. Int’l Olympic 
Comm. (IOC), CAS 00/006 (Sept. 22, 2000) (citing previous CAS awards), with Int’l Ass’n of 
Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. U.S.A. Track & Field (USATF), CAS 2004/A/628 (June 28, 2004); Int’l 
Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. Fèdèration Camerounaise d’Athlètisme (CMR), CAS 
2003/A/448 (Oct. 2, 2003) (previous CAS awards not cited). 
 118. Compare F. v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2004/A/714 (Mar. 31, 2005); Longo v. 
Int’l Ass’n of Athletic Fed’ns (IAAF), CAS 2002/A/409 (Mar. 28, 2003) (citing previous CAS 
awards), with Kop v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF), CAS 2008/A/1585 (Nov. 10, 2009) 
(previous CAS awards not cited). 
 119. Compare Anderson v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2008/A/1545, ¶ 3 (July 16, 
2010); Devyatovskiy v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2009/A/1752 (June 10, 2010); Anderson 
v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), 2008/A/1545 PA (Dec. 18, 2009); Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns 
(IAAF) v. All Russia Fed’n, CAS 2008/A/1718 (Nov. 18, 2009); Ohuruogu v. U.K. Athletics Ltd. 
(UKA), CAS 2006/A/1165 (Apr. 3, 2007); U.S. Olympic Comm. (USOC) v. Int’l Olympic Comm. 
(IOC), CAS 2004/A/725 (July 20, 2005); A. v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2004/A/718 (Mar. 
31, 2005); Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. Fèdèration Royale Marocaine d’Athlètisme 
(MAR), CAS 2003/A/452 (Nov. 19, 2003); W. v. UK Athletics, CAS 2003/A/455 (Aug. 21, 2003); 
Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. U.S.A. Track & Field (USATF), CAS 2002/O/401 (Jan. 
10, 2003); Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. CAF & Z., CAS 2002/A/362 (Aug. 27, 2002); 
Melinte v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n (IAAF), CAS 00/015 (Sept. 29, 2000) (citing previous CAS 
awards), with Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. Real Federatión Española de Atletismo 
(RFEA), CAS 2009/A/1805 (Sept. 22, 2009); Gatlin v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA), CAS 
2008/A/1461 (June 6, 2008) (previous CAS awards not cited). 
 120. BLACKSHAW, supra note 6, at 155. 
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unlikely to succeed.121  CAS panels are extremely reluctant to depart from 
precedent.122  In the interest of fairness to the parties, it is therefore critical 
that the CAS publish all nonconfidential awards, and refrain from allowing 
parties to rely on confidential awards. 
The application of jurisprudence constante to CAS arbitration also 
raises questions with respect to the parties’ choice of law.  For example, 
CAS awards sometimes cite precedent from a different division.123  Since the 
Ordinary and Appeals Arbitration Divisions follow different default rules for 
the applicable subsidiary law, reliance on precedent across divisions runs the 
risk of a conflict with the applicable subsidiary law.124  Admittedly, the 
difference between interpreting international sports regulations under Swiss 
as opposed to Monegasque law is perhaps of no practical import.125  
Nevertheless, citing to precedent without reference to the applicable law 
runs contrary to the principle of party autonomy in arbitration.  One CAS 
panel attempted to evade this quandary by arguing that the parties implicitly 
chose lex sportiva as their governing law: “Since CAS jurisprudence is 
largely based on a variety of sports regulations, the parties’ reliance on CAS 
precedents in their pleadings amounts to the choice of that specific body of 
case law encompassing certain general principles derived from and 
applicable to sports regulations.”126 
That is, when parties refer to precedent in their briefs, the panel may 
rely on past awards as a means of honoring the principle of party 
autonomy.127  This doctrine could create a problematic dilemma for parties, 
however.  Considering the CAS tends to follow past awards, claims that run 
contrary to precedent have little chance of succeeding.  Thus, a party would 
be remiss to avoid citing to CAS awards that favor her position.  On the 
other hand, panels may treat citations to precedent as evidence of the party’s 
acquiescence to the choice of lex sportiva as a source of substantive law 
 
 121. See supra note 51; Ohuruogu, CAS 2006/A/1165, at ¶ 17 (rather than departing from prior 
precedent, the Panel distinguished the case from prior precedent). 
 122. See Anderson, CAS 2008/A/1545, ¶ 55 (“[I]t must accord to previous CAS awards a 
substantial precedential value and it is up to the party advocating a jurisprudential change to submit 
persuasive arguments . . . .”). 
 123. See Mitten & Opie, supra note 3, at 291. 
 124. See CAS CODE, supra note 19, at R45. 
 125. See id. 
 126. Canadian Olympic Comm. (COC) v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2002/O/372, ¶ 14 
(Dec. 18, 2003). 
 127. Id. 
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governing the arbitration.128  If only one party cites to CAS precedent, what 
then?  The award in Anderson confirms that parties may at least “in theory” 
plead based on the lex sportiva, provided the content of the law asserted is 
sufficiently clear and predictable.129  Future research on the CAS is needed 
to determine the means by which parties “opt in” or “opt out” of the use of 
CAS precedent. 
In sum, while this study does not attempt to provide a definitive answer 
to the debate over whether the CAS follows a doctrine of stare decisis, to the 
extent that the sample is representative of CAS jurisprudence more 
generally, it suggests that the use of precedent approximates the civil law 
doctrine of jurisprudence constante rather than stare decisis.  CAS panels 
follow past awards, but do not regard precedent as binding.130  At a 
minimum, the CAS’s exclusive jurisdiction over disciplinary cases involving 
international-level Olympic athletes, as well as the emergence of a body of 
CAS jurisprudence independent of national legislation, has already led to the 
emergence of a distinctively autonomous system of global private 
regulation. 
 
 128. See, e.g., LATTY, supra note 1. 
 129. Anderson, CAS 2008/A/1545, ¶ 65. 
 130. See BLACKSHAW, supra note 6, at 155. 
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